Identifying and mitigating the risks of wealth inequality in the UK
Report of an expert roundtable held at King’s College London on 1 November 2024
Britain is a wealthy country, but its wealth is increasingly concentrated in few hands. While wealth inequality has remained high but fairly stable in relative terms over recent decades (with the richest 10% owning about 60% of the UK’s wealth), substantial rises in the value of assets led to a 50% increase in the size of the absolute wealth gap between the richest and poorest households between 2011 and 2019. As a result, wealth – or its absence – has a bigger impact on people’s lives than ever before, from their housing to their health. The fact that much wealth is unearned raises serious questions of fairness, but the size of the wealth gap also has demonstrably negative impacts on our economy, society, democracy and environment. The Fairness Foundation's Wealth Gap Risk Register documents 41 negative impacts of wealth inequality in the UK (alongside 29 policy responses), and suggests that these existing impacts will worsen in the future as the wealth gap continues to increase, unless action is taken to mitigate them.
On 1 November 2024 the Fairness Foundation, the Future Threats Lab at the Department of War Studies, and the Policy Institute at King’s College London convened a one-day workshop for 25 senior stakeholders from the worlds of politics, government, academia, business and civil society. Its purpose was to examine the evidence for the risks posed by wealth inequality in the UK to our society, economy, democracy and environment, and for the ways in which those risks can be mitigated through government policy.
A specific aim was to explore to what extent this diverse group of people had a shared diagnosis of the risks and shared views on the most effective and realistic mitigation strategies. Participants were invited to evaluate three possible futures for the UK when thinking about risks and mitigation strategies, with a particular focus on the impacts of wealth inequality on the fabric of British society:
- Future 1: Stabilisation Wealth inequality is reduced, and social cohesion improves
- Future 2: Decline Wealth inequality is maintained, and social cohesion gradually worsens
- Future 3: Collapse Wealth inequality increases, contributing to societal dysfunction, unrest or conflict
We followed up the report in January 2025 with some polling with Opinium, to explore how the British public feels about the influence of the very wealthy on politics. The polling found that 63% of Britons think that the very rich have too much influence on politics in the UK (compared to 40% who think the same about businesses and religious organisations, and 38% for international organisations like the EU and UN). The view that the very rich have too much influence on UK politics was most widely held by people who voted Lib Dem at the 2024 general election (78%), followed by Labour (67%), Reform (65%) and Conservative (56%). Download the full data tables (xlsx)
Media coverage
James Tapper
How to read this report
You can read this report online; click on a link below to jump straight to the summary or to the full write-up of one of the three workshop sessions. You can also download a PDF version of the report (22 pages, including an appendix containing the ‘briefing book’ circulated to participants in advance of the event).
Acknowledgements
This report is authored by:
- Will Snell, Chief Executive, Fairness Foundation
- Dr Jeni Mitchell, Lecturer in War Studies and Founder of the Future Threats Lab, King’s College London
- Suzanne Hall, Director of Engagement, The Policy Institute, King’s College London
- Dr Eitan Oren, Lecturer in War Studies, Department of War Studies, King’s College London
We are grateful for the support of the following researchers for their support with facilitation and note-taking on the day:
- Anita Sangha, Research Assistant, Fairness Foundation
- Jack Jeffrey, Researcher, Fairness Foundation
- Owen Hanley, MA Student in International Conflict Studies, King’s College London
- Zachary Kallenborn, PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London
- Robert Millar, Research Assistant, Future Threats Lab, King’s College London
Thank you to our 25 participants for their time, energy and insights. We very much hope that they remain involved in the next phase of this project. As the workshop was held under Chatham House rules, we are not disclosing their identities or institutional affiliations.
A consensus of concern
We did not expect a varied group of 25 people from a range of sectors and backgrounds to agree from the outset that wealth inequality poses a major risk to British society. But this is exactly what happened. When we carried out a quick straw poll, everyone in the room - without exception - thought it plausible that growing wealth inequality could be a major driver of societal collapse in the UK within the next decade.
Over three structured sessions, we asked participants, working together in small groups, to identify the direct and second-order consequences of wealth inequality in Britain today (a ‘futures wheel’ exercise); to think about what might need to happen for British society to collapse within ten years, and what role wealth inequality might play in this (a ‘backcasting’ exercise); and to identify and prioritise potential interventions to avoid such a scenario and to build a more hopeful future (a ‘roadmapping’ exercise).
This short report summarises the points made by participants during the workshop.
Teetering on the brink
The first session, on the consequences of wealth inequality, revealed deep concern about the ways in which wealth inequality is destabilising British society. One participant described Britain as ‘an alcoholic… one shot away from catastrophe’. Despite efforts to ‘right the ship’, there was agreement with the suggestion that we are currently on a trajectory of decline, with wealth inequality undermining social cohesion and a risk of further deterioration without intervention.
Participants discussed how institutions are being systematically weakened, through multiple mechanisms. The government’s ‘business model’ is broken, being over-reliant on revenue from taxing income, with insufficient revenue raised from taxing wealth. Public services are deteriorating, undermining the ability of the state to meet people’s basic human needs such as health and social care, education and housing. The social contract has demonstrably collapsed, along with public trust in government and democratic institutions, and people’s belief in the willingness and ability of mainstream politicians to improve their lives. Wealthy interests have effectively captured media and political narratives, using their dominance of the national conversation to argue that the status quo is the only way, but it is increasingly clear to everyone that this is not the case.
In the absence of genuine alternatives or any sense of real hope being offered by mainstream politicians, people are unsurprisingly turning to populists who provide easy answers and tempting scapegoats. The political system has neither the will nor the ability to think and act in the long-term interests of the country, or to consider wide-ranging structural reforms instead of narrow fixes. The speed with which the problems are mounting up far outstrips the pace at which institutions try to keep up with them.
Without decisive action to address wealth inequality and its consequences in the coming years, the UK risks entering a period of deep social deterioration that will affect everyone, however wealthy they are.
A range of possible triggers
The second session examined what events or trends over the next decade might contribute to full-blown societal collapse in the UK, and the role of wealth inequality in driving or exacerbating this risk.
Multiple pathways to disintegration were identified, with potential triggers including economic crises (such as runaway inflation and currency collapse) to climate events (such as a catastrophic failure of the Thames Barrier, or crop failures elsewhere in the world) and technological disruption (such as AI-linked mass unemployment and advances in quantum computing ending privacy as we know it). The behaviour of elites provides warning signs, with tech leaders who are buying up bunkers in New Zealand described as ‘canaries in the coal mine’.
Several theoretical frameworks identify rising wealth inequality as a driver of societal disintegration and collapse. Peter Turchin collates historical evidence to argue that growing poverty combined with wealth inequality and ‘elite overproduction' tends to result in societal collapse in the absence of determined action to avert it. Today we see political and economic ‘counter-elites’ aligning – most notably in the shape of Trump and Musk in the US, but also in the UK – around a narrative that speaks to popular discontent with wealth inequality, while proposing solutions that will dramatically worsen it and increase the risks of societal breakdown.
Quick fixes and deeper changes
In the third and final session, participants looked at what interventions would be most effective at mitigating the risks posed to society by rising wealth inequality.
Political leaders are under enormous pressure to deliver quick and measurable improvements to living standards. However, rising inequality coupled with declining public services makes it increasingly hard to deliver these results through ‘sticking plaster’ approaches that aim to fix one specific problem without attempting deeper reform of systems and institutions. As one system or service starts to fail, it increases pressure on other systems and services, creating a vicious cycle. Piecemeal solutions will not stop the rot; only a comprehensive approach to tackling the underlying issues will deliver the progress needed. And wealth inequality is one such underlying issue.
The challenge, therefore, is to find ways to achieve short-term progress while rapidly building the coalitions needed to overcome the many obstacles to more fundamental institutional reform. These coalitions must include the public, and rebuilding public trust requires political leaders to set out a compelling vision of what constitutes a ‘good society’ and how they will rebuild the social contract.
Sequencing is difficult. The most urgent actions are not necessarily the easiest to introduce. Taxing wealth is necessary to both generate more revenue to rebuild public services and rebuild public trust in politics. However, making this happen at the scale needed is hard to do in the face of determined resistance from vested interests. Standing up to them requires reforming our political system, for example by strengthening our inadequate lobbying regulations. These political reforms are therefore a priority. If implemented effectively, they can yield the double benefit of helping to restore public faith in the political system while reducing the barriers to deeper structural reforms.
Many other deep-seated changes are needed to deliver lasting and significant improvements to people’s life chances and outcomes. All involve some level of spending, but not all are hugely expensive. Fixing our dysfunctional housing and employment markets mainly requires our political leaders to have the political courage and vision to act boldly in part by relinquishing control – to act in the interests of the long term, and to devolve power down to the local level.
Reasons for pessimism and hope
There are plenty of grounds for pessimism.
On a practical level, driving through deep-rooted and broad-based reforms to multiple interdependent systems is extremely challenging. Political courage seems scarce, with short electoral cycles discouraging long-term thinking. In a widely recognised era of polycrisis, we should be at an inflection point where we start to take radical action in response, but this is not happening. This is in part because of an ongoing failure of our politics and society to recognise the problems, let alone agree on the solutions.
‘Sometimes paranoids have all the facts’, noted one participant drily, pointing to the accelerating pace of negative impacts from consumption, carbon emissions, big tech (both a risk itself, and an accelerant of other risks) and other sources, and contrasting this with the glacial response of government – ‘like taking a pea-shooter to a gunfight’.
Perhaps most worrying is how wealth inequality makes society more vulnerable to other threats while simultaneously reducing our capacity to respond. From climate change to technological disruption, each challenge becomes more dangerous in an unequal society with eroding institutions and declining trust.
However, there are also reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for progress.
For a start, there are precedents for radical reforms that have transformed society for the better (even if many of them have emerged from war, revolution or plague, as Walter Scheidel has observed). The most obvious recent example is the 1945 creation of the welfare state, but Turchin also points to how Britain in the 19th century avoided the revolutions that swept continental Europe through a series of enlightened economic and political reforms, such as the Great Reform Act and the repeal of the Corn Laws.
Reducing the risks posed by wealth inequality to society requires action to be taken to reduce the size of the wealth gap in the UK, but it can be achieved in part by reducing the negative impacts of wealth inequality on people’s lives. Participants discussed how Finland and several other Scandinavian countries have high levels of wealth inequality, but have achieved low levels of income inequality, and a high standard of living for those with less wealth, through investment in strong public services and an effective social safety net. Wales shows how long-term thinking can be embedded into all levels of public life through legislation, with its Wellbeing of Future Generations Act.
Ultimately, there was a recognition that progress at a level equal to the scale of the challenge is almost impossible without finding ways to reduce the influence on political decision-making of those with the most power and a vested interest in the status quo. But if this can be done, there is huge potential. Societies are complex adaptive systems, so small changes can have disproportionate impacts. Often this dynamic works to the disadvantage of those who push for social progress, but it can also be harnessed in a positive direction.
Plans for future work
Several participants at the workshop pointed out that getting a group of experts into a room to propose top-down solutions is not, on its own, a sufficient response. We need to engage with people who have more right to be pessimistic about society than a group of relatively privileged policy professionals.
With that in mind, and building on an existing evidence base of academic and public policy research on the risks of wealth inequality and how to mitigate them, we now plan to study in more depth what the public thinks about these issues. We will shortly be submitting funding applications to carry out quantitative and qualitative research on public attitudes in this area.
We plan to use a participatory futures approach to help people to imagine the future in a realistic and grounded way. We want to better understand how views vary based on demographics (including people’s wealth) and political beliefs, and how best to engage different segments of the population on both the risks of wealth inequality and how they can be mitigated. A particular objective of this attitudinal research will be to shed more light on how wealth inequality is undermining faith in mainstream democratic politics and the social contract, and how best to reverse this process. We will be looking in particular, but not exclusively, at the impact of wealth inequality on younger generations.
Scenario
Future 2 (Decline): Wealth inequality is maintained, and social cohesion gradually worsens
This scenario is the status quo outlined in the Wealth Gap Risk Register – the trajectory which we are on at present in the UK, based on the best available evidence. The report suggests that the negative impacts of wealth inequality on our society, economy, democracy and environment are not just hypothetical future risks, but rather impacts that have already been realised. Because there are plenty of reasons to expect that the wealth gap in the UK will continue to widen over the coming years, the obvious risk is that each of these existing impacts worsens over time. And since many of these impacts interact and reinforce each other, just as different forms of inequality intersect and exacerbate each other, it is not unrealistic to speculate that we could see the negative impacts of wealth inequality snowballing in the UK over the next couple of decades, and beyond, if action is not taken to reduce the wealth gap or to mitigate its impacts (or ideally both).
While there is limited public awareness of the ways in which wealth inequality undermines economic growth, and the meritocratic mindset retains a strong grip on worldviews, most people have an intuitive understanding that the increasing wealth gap is unfair in terms of both its causes and its consequences. Growing popular disengagement and distrust with politics is in part driven by this awareness, and is already damaging our democracy and social cohesion, with a real risk of much worse to come in the future.
Questions for discussion
Can you identify some of the direct results that wealth inequality is already having in the UK, or that seem likely to happen in the next one to five years)?
What might the second-order consequences of those direct impacts be over this timeframe, and how might they interact?
Summary of the discussion
The first session revealed how wealth inequality acts as both driver and amplifier of societal challenges. One participant described the UK as ‘an alcoholic that is one shot away from catastrophe’, though others noted there are still forces working to ‘right the ship’.
The systematic erosion of public trust in institutions, which has declined sharply since the 1980s, was a central topic of discussion. The dynamic appears to be self-reinforcing: as wealthy individuals and organisations control the narrative through media ownership and lobbying, public trust deteriorates further. The example of Elon Musk's acquisition of Twitter was cited as a deliberate attempt to ‘control the truth and the conspiracies’.
The workshop identified a negative feedback loop in relation to the government’s ability to improve people’s lives. Due in part to its failure to tax wealth effectively, the government lacks sufficient revenue to uphold the social contract by which strong public services, an effective social safety net and a healthy economy provide people with decent living standards. This creates a vicious cycle: public services deteriorate due to underfunding, living standards fall, public trust in politics declines further, politicians avoid honest discussions of the underlying problems and what to do about them, and the system's legitimacy is increasingly questioned. This allows populists allied to wealthy funders to take control of the narrative and to deflect attention away from the negative impacts of wealth inequality, thus undermining efforts by government to break the cycle through tax reforms and other initiatives to combat wealth inequality.
Economic stagnation, combined with high levels of inequality, is now a feature of Britain. A visible indicator of economic health is the ‘crane index’ - the number of construction cranes visible in central London - which has decreased markedly in recent years, suggesting declining investment confidence. Participants drew parallels with pre-crisis situations in other countries, such as the 2019-2020 Chilean riots that were triggered by subway fare increases but were rooted in deeper inequalities.
We live in a society where belonging to a particular group is becoming more important than competence or service delivery. This manifests through growing polarisation between different social groups, the rising prominence of conspiracy theories, and the breakdown of traditional community structures. In London, rising costs are breaking up established ethnic communities and changing the cultural fabric of neighbourhoods. Politicians who focus on delivery and managerialism, in the mistaken belief that having a big vision is risky or a distraction from the real issues, fail to see how these trends demand a bolder style of politics that draws people in and transcends the divisions stoked by culture warriors.
Early childhood education provides a stark window into broader societal issues. Teachers report children arriving at school lacking basic developmental milestones - unable to hold pens, with short attention spans, not being toilet trained. This reflects many parents' inability to invest time in their children because they have to work long hours to make ends meet, shifting the burden of primary socialisation onto already strained schools. The education system is being asked to do much more than it should, because of the burdens of inequality. The same is true of the health service, the social security system, the criminal justice system, and so on.
The concentration of power is a crucial issue. The UK's unusually large and poorly regulated lobbying sector allows wealth to translate directly into political influence. This concentration manifests through strong pushback against even modest attempts to better tax wealth, the defence of vested interests in areas such as housing and land reform, and the decline of counterbalancing forces like civil society organisations.
The psychological consequences were also discussed. Wealth inequality robs people of hope for the future, creates a sense of entrapment and reduced ambition, and influences how people view their own agency and possibilities. This also reduces people's willingness to engage in democratic processes, to believe in the possibility of positive change, and to have faith in the power of governments to deliver this.
Why are political parties not making the tackling of socio-economic inequality a focal point of their policy platforms? The short-term nature of electoral cycles discourages tackling long-term problems like inequality, particularly when there are active disincentives to address it.
There was widespread agreement that wealth inequality represents a fundamental challenge to social cohesion, democratic functioning, and institutional stability. Any potential positive aspects of wealth inequality, such as increased philanthropy, are wildly insufficient compensation for the broader negative impacts. The interconnected nature of these negative consequences suggests that addressing wealth inequality requires a similarly interconnected and comprehensive response.
Scenario
Future 3 (Collapse): Wealth inequality increases, contributing to societal dysfunction, unrest and/or conflict
The future scenario presented to participants in our second session assumes that wealth inequality has continued to worsen over the next eight years, and many of the consequences noted in our first session are coming to pass. In addition, the global context has not significantly improved: events in the UK are occurring against a backdrop of climate crisis, regional wars and hostile relations with Russia and its allies, international financial instability and trade disruptions, paralysis within international institutions, disinformation campaigns, disruption due to new technologies, and growing nationalist movements around the world.
By 2032, large parts of the UK appear to be on the verge of a breakdown in public order and government function. The 2029 election returned Labour to power but only by the barest margins, and the party is severely divided in how to respond to the crisis. The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats have been joined in opposition by the New Britain Alliance party, which has rapidly attracted members and funders as the crisis has intensified. The NBA is promoting narratives helping to fuel protests and violence, and recent polling suggests that a snap election held today could catapult the NBA leader into Number 10.
The most affected regions are mid-sized to large cities, which are experiencing violent riots and clashes between opposing protestors; organised attacks on government buildings and corporate offices; food and fuel shortages; overwhelmed health services; and transport breakdowns due to unexpected weather events. London is experiencing most of the above, although with more resources to address the crisis, but is also experiencing violence and unrest from out-of-area protestors and rioters. A number of market towns and smaller communities are not experiencing violence, but the growing breakdown of government and order has led to the ‘emergency takeover’ of local governments by branches of the New Britain Alliance party. In rural areas, food and fuel shortages are severe, and those with means are relocating to other areas in search of aid. In Northern Ireland, the crisis has escalated the debate over whether to hold the unification referendum; in Scotland and Wales, independence movements are rising in popularity.
Questions for discussion
Thinking of the period between now and this scenario in 2032, what sorts of events and trends would need to take place for this scenario to occur?
Thinking about the potential consequences of wealth inequality we have discussed so far today, which are most relevant for this scenario?
Summary of the discussion
The second session explored whether and how wealth inequality might contribute to societal disintegration in the UK by 2032. No one suggested that this scenario was far-fetched. However, it was suggested that disintegration be understood as a process rather than a single event, as history has shown on many occasions, one example being Liberia's experience in the 1980s.
The discussion identified several potential triggers for such a scenario. One suggestion was Tommy Robinson's hypothetical death in prison becoming a catalyst for far-right mobilisation. If subsequent protests led to fatalities, this could normalise political violence for many years. This scenario is plausible because increasing numbers of people see conventional political processes as being ineffective, making violence appear a more legitimate alternative.
Possible economic triggers include hyperinflation, the collapse of the pound, capital flight, huge fuel price rises, and a collapse in the value of pensions. AI-driven unemployment could uniquely affect Britain, particularly damaging London's role as ‘the banker of Europe’ and potentially leading to ‘10 million scale unemployment’. When things started looking bad, capital and corporate flight would accelerate the decline: ‘if you can move a car factory, you can move just about anything’.
There are several potential climate and environmental triggers. The potential failure of the Thames Barrier emerged as a specific concern, with some suggesting that such an event might even spark religious revival movements. Food security issues and resource scarcity would have a disproportionate impact on less wealthy groups. There is a troubling trend of oligarchs and investment corporations like BlackRock and Vanguard buying up agricultural land.
Political triggers are extremely plausible, with a ‘knife-edge' election in 2029 set to be crucial, and a massive crisis of the two-party system not unlikely. Some suggested that post-election riots might lead the next government to take steps that would damage democracy, such as introducing policies to disenfranchise those not born in the UK, while others foresaw the rise of a more competent far-right politician than Nigel Farage.
The international context is crucial. The 2024 US election could drive further polarisation and lead to American isolationism, emboldening Russia (the workshop took place four days before election day). The Israel-Hezbollah war could trigger refugee crises, as could crop failures in countries like Egypt. The Ministry of Defence's flagship future threats analysis, Global Strategic Trends 7 (2024), includes scenarios in which non-state actors gain more influence in political vacuums caused by societal collapse.
Technology is both a threat in itself and an accelerant of societal disintegration. Quantum computing could end privacy as we know it, while AI is likely to erode middle-class careers. We could see a ‘Chinese-style' system of technological control in response to unrest. Mainstream media outlets are increasingly seen as less truthful and are playing ‘catch up’ to alternative sources like social media and Telegram, which often provide a platform for more extreme worldviews.
Societal disintegration would be likely to manifest differently across different regions of the UK, with some areas becoming ‘tinderbox’ zones. This could resemble Lagos-style social stratification, where high-security areas experience no social disorder while other areas deteriorate rapidly. The alienation and marginalisation of rural communities could give rise to anti-city ‘tractor riots’.
The behaviour of societal elites is a particularly worrying trend. Wealthy individuals are already preparing for collapse, with some Silicon Valley leaders purchasing New Zealand bunkers. We should see these trends as ‘canaries in the coal mine’. Another concern is brain drain, with skilled workers likely to leave in a scenario of increasing social unrest, and to have little incentive to return.
The consensus view among participants was that while complete societal collapse might be unlikely, significant disintegration was plausible by 2032 without intervention to tackle wealth inequality and related challenges. Wealth inequality acts as both a direct driver of disintegration and as a ‘threat multiplier’ that makes society more vulnerable to other destabilising forces.
Traditional assumptions that social stability will prevail, based on recent historical precedent, are no long safe, given the unprecedented combination of challenges and the accelerating pace of change. There is a yawning asymmetry between the speed of technological and social change and the pace of governmental and institutional adaptation. Disintegration itself is rooted in the fact that the conventional political processes and wider narratives are no longer working for people.
Scenario
Future 1 (Stabilisation): Wealth inequality is reduced, and social cohesion improves
In this scenario, the situation in the UK in 2032 has significantly improved from today. These improvements helped Labour retain power in the 2029 election, and fledgling movements like the New Britain Alternative Party remain marginal actors. Surveys show a higher level of public trust in government and public institutions, and a perception that the political sphere is less corrupt than it used to be. All of this is a great benefit to the UK government as it tries to cope with a global context that remains very challenging.
Key improvements include: less pressure on the social safety net due to fewer people requiring support; a better functioning NHS and other public services; more people able to take up education and training; the curtailing of the rising costs of housing, energy, care and childcare; and perceived reductions in racial, gender and generational inequalities. Some serious challenges remain, but there is a sense that the UK is ‘on the right track’ toward becoming a more stable and fair society.
While progress across many issue areas has contributed to this positive future, this exercise focused on wealth inequality specifically. The scenario presumes that wealth inequality has been reduced in Scenario 1, and that this is both a causal driver and a consequence of social stabilisation.
Questions for discussion
What are the key interventions necessary to advance toward the positive vision of Future 1, focusing specifically on the issue of wealth inequality?
Do some interventions need to come before others? Which ones are most critical?
Can some interventions be combined into single initiatives?
What are the barriers to achieving these interventions?
Are there specific bottlenecks in your roadmap?
Are there gaps in the roadmap?
What sorts of activities can be undertaken to encourage these interventions to happen?
Who are the key stakeholders that can help deliver the roadmap?
What are the most important initial steps to be taken?
Summary of the discussion
The final session focused on identifying concrete interventions to prevent societal disintegration and address wealth inequality.
A key underlying problem is the economic logic of perpetual consumption and perpetual profit, with the ideal of infinite growth confronting a reality of finite resources. New models are needed, based on principles that give equal weight to ecological sustainability and wellbeing as to growth and profit.
Revenue generation is a key priority. This requires the more effective taxation of wealth, and not just of high earners. There are significant implementation challenges, not least the need to move on from a Victorian-era tax system more broadly, and a great deal of political courage is needed to overcome the inevitable pushback from interest groups.
Housing is a critical intervention area, with calls for increased house building, social housing subsidies, and planning reforms. The UK has more school property per child than any other country in Europe, suggesting that there is potential for creative solutions to the housing crisis. But clever wheezes won’t be enough; deeper structural reforms are needed, which, again, requires tackling powerful vested interests.
Education was discussed in depth, with a particular focus on private schools. Some suggested gradually abolishing private schools by incentivising them to become state schools; economic turmoil might accelerate this process. One participant observed that the UK should have used the COVID-19 pandemic to nationalise private hospitals, suggesting that similar opportunities might arise for education.
Democratic renewal and devolution has to be part of the policy response to wealth inequality. Participants called for empowering local decision-making through improved community engagement and hyper-local mechanisms. The need for long-term thinking was stressed repeatedly, with suggestions to take certain issues out of electoral cycles and create institutions focused on future-oriented policy.
Several measures to ‘derisk life’ were proposed, including a universal basic income, a four-day work week, and public wealth funds made accessible to small businesses. There were many international examples to draw on; for example, countries like Finland have high levels of wealth inequality but low levels of income inequality and high standards of living, in part because of strong public services and an effective welfare system and social safety net. This arrangement came about through a deal struck by social democrats and conservatives, allowing wealthy individuals to retain their wealth in exchange for not opposing social reforms.
Historical precedents featured prominently, for example in a discussion about the factors that gave birth to the welfare state in 1945. Unfortunately, many of the enablers of change during this period, such as the unifying post-war threat from communism, and the needs and desires of those who had fought and those who had struggled at home, no longer apply. Today’s generation of politicians must also confront new challenges, such as the climate crisis and the pressures of an ageing population.
Changemakers - whether inside or outside politics – need to build constituencies for change. As one participant noted, ‘if you aren't at the table, you are on the menu’. So far, we have not seen the emergence of a broad-based anti-inequality coalition that has both the interest and the power to effect change, and to overcome the counter-arguments and resistance of powerful groups with vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Building broad coalitions is crucial for overcoming political inertia. These coalitions can be designed to appeal to a broad range of groups, with a focus on ‘win-win’ solutions such as rebuilding public services and reducing poverty, rather than necessarily leading on reducing inequality as the key unifying call to action; but action to reduce inequality must be at the core of the vision and the agenda.
Politicians must set out a popular vision, rather than retreating into the perceived safety of managerialism and ‘deliverism’. This must include defining what constitutes a ‘good society’ and a meaningful social contract before seeking to implement specific solutions. Coherent narratives can help to counter rising nostalgia and populism, and to overcome the political and media opposition that kills many policy proposals before they get anywhere near to being implemented. Misperception by politicians of public attitudes is also a problem, and likewise the inertia caused by politicians' desire not to annoy voters. One way around this would be to legally mandate the consideration of long term issues and the interests of future generations when designing and implementing policies, as has been legislated for in Wales.
This final session concluded with a debate about whether these sorts of interventions could succeed in time to prevent serious societal deterioration. While some saw hope in the comprehensive nature of proposed solutions, others worried about implementation challenges and political feasibility. As one participant pointed out, ‘we should be at an inflection point, but we aren't’. Changing this will require political leaders to find ways to deliver rapid improvements to people’s lives while starting to enact more fundamental reforms that are necessary for long-lasting and deep-rooted progress.